HomeMy WebLinkAbout05.K- Police ^5 K
DOC ID: 4141 E
CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO — REQUEST FOR COUNCIL ACTION
Report/Information
From: Jarrod Burguan M/CC Meeting Date: 11/16/2015
Prepared by: Susanna Sandoval, (909)
384-5742
Dept: Police Ward(s): All
Subject:
Discuss and Take Possible Action Regarding the Police Services Five Year Resources
Plan (#4141)
Current Business Registration Certificate: Not Applicable
Financial Impact:
There is no Financial Impact
Motion: Adopt the Police Services Five Year Resources Plan for inclusion in the
City's strategic and annual budget planning p rocesses. Actual resources
allocations to support the plan will be addressed annually during the City's
budget process.
Synopsis of Previous Council Action:
None.
Background:
See attached report.
Supporting Documents:
Police Services Master Plan 11.10.15 (PDF)
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Updated: 11/10/2015 by Georgeann Gigi Hanna E
To: Mayor and Common Council
From: Chief Jarrod Burguan
Subject: Police Services Five Year Resources Plan
Date: November 10, 2015
Copies:
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Adopt the Police Services Five Year Resources Plan for inclusion in the City's strategic
and annual budget planning processes. Actual resources allocations to support the plan
will be addressed annually during the City's budget process. cn
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Executive Summary o
San Bernardino's future and its prospects for recovery rest in large part on its ability to
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cut its rate of violent and other crime, and address the perception that San Bernardino is a r
dangerous city. Increased public safety alone will not be enough to improve the city's
financial outlook,but unless and until residents,business owners and visitors feel safe in
San Bernardino, other efforts to stabilize it and attract economic development will be
hampered by ongoing fears of crime.
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The
Mayor, Common Council and San Bernardino's residents agree that crime is the o.
most important issue the City faces. In fact during the strategic planning process held in N
the fall of 2014 this issue emerged as the community's top priority. This strategic
process,which directly engaged hundreds of City residents,provides a foundation for the
City's Recovery Plan adopted by the Council and filed with the Proposed Plan of
Adjustment/Disclosure Statement in Bankruptcy Court in May. These plans called for
additional strategic initiatives to enhance public safety,but of necessity, these initiatives d
were not as defined and specific as would have been preferred.
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Objections filed by creditors in response to the City's proposed Recovery Plan included
many complaints and requests for further justification for any additional spending. This E
Police Services Five Year Resources Plan(Plan) is intended to provide additional
specifics and justification regarding Police services. It will be used to support the updated Q
Plan of Adjustment to be filed with the Court before the end of the year. It was developed
by a team of our top command staff in the Police Department, supported by our
bankruptcy consultants Management Partners.
No one familiar with the City will be surprised that improving public safety will require
an investment in the San Bernardino Police Department to increase staffing levels, obtain
upgraded technology, replace its aging fleet and engage the community to assist in
fighting crime. Even as the City is making difficult decisions and cutting its budget to
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recover financially, investing resources in the Police Department will help San
Bernardino attract and retain residents and businesses,both of which are necessary to its
long-term economic recovery. No police department that has lost 30 percent of its force
can be expected to fight crime at the same levels as before the cuts; such a loss will
almost inevitably lead to a city that is less safe and less desirable to residents,businesses
and visitors.
We are asking that the Common Council adopt this Police Services Five Year Resources
Plan and include it in the City's strategic and budget planning processes. While this
document is a Plan, and therefore subject to changes, it lays out an approach to investing c
in the Police Department that I believe offers the best strategy for reducing crime and
making San Bernardino a community of choice. The proposed Plan outlined in this
document would require an additional $56,504,098 over five years to implement.
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There are three areas that need investment in order to better equip the San Bernardino
Police Department to fight crime. The first is to increase the staffing levels of the
department,which have fallen by 30 percent since 2009. Currently there are only enough N
patrol units to respond to calls for service, and response times to those calls have 2
increased dramatically. The department will be unable to address safety issues in the City o0
until it has enough officers to respond to calls for service,build relationships, and work r
with the community on proactive solutions to crime. Increasing staffing levels will also
require greater effort to recruit qualified officers to the department. This is a challenge for
well-funded, stable departments, and even more so for a department like San
Bernardino's,but it is a clear priority that deserves a well-thought-out plan and sufficient °
funding.
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The second area requiring investment is technology. The department's systems are aging a
and deficient,with some obsolete and no longer supported. The deficiencies hamper y
officers' ability to react to crimes that have occurred and plan strategically to prevent 2
future crime. There also are inadequate plans for business continuity and access to critical a
systems should the department's servers become damaged or impaired due to their 0
location and current configuration. Finally, there are no funds being allocated to replace in
systems as they become obsolete, and such systems are usually too expensive to purchase
using one cycle of funding. o
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Lastly,the department's fleet is aging,with more than half of all police cars 10 years or
older and roughly a fifth with more than 100,000 miles. As a result, vehicles are kept on E
the road longer. This causes repair costs to escalate and vehicles to be kept out of service
for longer periods of time. Furthermore,there is no vehicle replacement fund or any other Q
mechanism to replace vehicles as they age.
Crime, Safety and Economic Development
San Bernardino suffers from unacceptably high levels of crime, with crime rates that are
several orders of magnitude higher than other cities in Southern California and across the
state. Furthermore, violent crime,which imposes significantly higher costs on a
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community than non-violent crime, occurs at much higher rates in San Bernardino than in
peer cities regionally and throughout the state. The City will not be able to attract the new
residents and businesses needed for economic growth until this problem is addressed, and
it will take considerable resources to do so.
Comparative Crime Rates
As shown in Figure 1, San Bernardino has more than double the violent crime rate as
either the surrounding region or the state as a whole. In fact for every three violent crimes
per 1,000 residents in the region,there are ten such crimes in San Bernardino. With crime
rates ranging from two to three times more than in the state and region, recovery and
economic development will be a tough task. Before living in or investing in a community, a
people need to feel safe, and unfortunately that is not the reality now in San Bernardino. i
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Figure 1. State and Regional Crime Rates Compared to San Bernardino in 2014
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Sources:2015 California Department of Finance;2014 Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Reports v
Notes:Region average includes large nearby cities:Fontana,Moreno Valley,Rancho Cucamonga,Ontario,Riverside, p
and Corona.Part 1 crimes include violent and property crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. a.
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San Bernardino's crime rates are high even when compared to other high-crime cities in T_
California. Of the 63 California cities with populations between 100,000 and 400,000, ,r,
San Bernardino has the second highest Part 1 crime rate. Table 1 provides demographic o
and crime data for the 10 cities with the highest crime rates within this population range.
Notably, San Bernardino also has a significantly lower median household income and a =
higher percentage of people in poverty than other cities with high rates of crime. People a
living in poverty are the victims of violent crime at more than twice the rate of high
income populations according to a study by the Bureau of Justice Statistics between 2008
and 2014.
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Table 1. High-Crime Cities in California between 100,000 and 400,000 in population— d
Demographic Data 2
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2014 Part 1 2014 Violent 2014 Percent 2013 2013
Crimes per Crimes per Violent Median Percent of
2015 1,000 1,000 Crime of Part Household All People
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Population Residents* .- • Poverty c0
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Antioch 108,298 46.9 7.8 17% $65,254 14.9 Q
Bakersfield 369,505 45.0 4.5 10% $56,204 20.4
Berkeley 118,780 46.7 3.6 8% $63,312 18.7
Concord 126,069 45.0 3.7 8% $65,798 12.1
Modesto 209,186 52.3 8.5 16% $47,060 20.8
Richmond 107,346 48.0 7.9 16% $54,589 18.5
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San Bernardino 213,933 53.7 9.9 19% $38,385 32.4
Stockton 306,999 56.1 13.0 23% $46,831 24.3
Vallejo 119,683 49.8 8.6 17% $58,371 17.5
Victorville 121,168 41.6 5.3 13% $50,034 25.3
State,;; 3874,25 Mr284*! 4°Q .14%y $61,094 15.9
Sources:2015 California Department of Finance;2014 Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Reports,2009-2013
American Community Survey Estimates
Note:Part 1 crimes include violent and property crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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San Bernardino's crime rates are especially high in comparison with other similarly-sized a
cities in Southern California. Of the 63 California cities between 100,000 and 400,000,
43 are in Southern California, 18 are in Northern California and two are in Central o
California. Southern California enjoys significantly lower levels of crime within this
population range. Only three of the 10 cities with the highest crime rates are in Southern
California(Bakersfield, San Bernardino, and Victorville). As shown in Figure 2, San '2
Bernardino's crime rate is highest among Southern California cities in this group, with in
more than double the average crime rate. The Part 1 crime rate in San Bernardino (the 0
city with the most crime) is more than four times that of Irvine,the city with the least o
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crime.
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Figure 2. Part 1 Crime Rate of Similar-Sized Southern California Cities in 2014
Part 1 Crimes per 1,000 Residents
Irvine 12.7
Santa Clarita am 12.9
Thousand Oaks 13.4
Simi Valley ;m N 14.0
Murrieta mmommmumagAmmunumm 14.3
Glendale 16.4
Orange 17.2 _
Carlsbad 17.5 Rf
Torrance 18.7 �-
Chula Vista 20.0 d
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Garden Grove 20.2 O
Santa Ana ` 21.1 O
N
Fontana 21.7 d
Norwalk son 21.7 d
El Monte 22.0 _v
Corona 22.7
Rancho Cucamonga 22.8 d
Huntington Beach 23.4 d
Escondido 24.1 t)
Temecula 24.3 O
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Burbank 24.4
Rialto 24.4 V_
Fullerton 25.3 r
El Cajon 25.5
Palmdale 26.0'
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AVERAGE 26.1 C
Anaheim 26.5
Oceanside 27.2 r
Pasadena 27.5 C
Downey 28.0 d
West Covina ` 28.2 L
Lancaster 28.5 w
Ontario 30.3 M
Inglewood 31.5
Costa Mesa 33.5 N
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Pomona 34.1 2
Santa Maria 34.2
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Moreno Valley 34.9 N
Oxnard 35.4 4)
Riverside 35.7 -
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Ventura 38.0 O
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Victorville 41.6
Bakersfield 45.0
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San Bernardino 53.7 E
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0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 V
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Sources:2015 California Department of Finance;2014 Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Reports Q
Note:Part 1 crimes include violent and property crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
San Bernardino's rates of crime also top national averages. San Bernardino has 53.7 Part
1 crimes per 1,000 residents and 9.9 violent crimes per 1,000 residents, significantly
higher than the respective national rates of 29.6 and 3.7, according to the 2014 Crime
Reports by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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While all crime is damaging to a community, research indicates that violent crime
imposes much higher costs than non-violent crime. In San Bernardino, the rate of violent
crime exceeds regional, state and national levels, which exacerbates the crime problem
the City faces. San Bernardino has the highest level of violent crime of any Southern
California city with a population between 100,000 and 400,000. It also has the second-
highest violent crime rate of any similarly sized city in California.
High Crime and Low to Average Police Expenditures
Fighting crime costs money and San Bernardino, impoverished and in bankruptcy has not
had the money necessary to address the problems. While San Bernardino has high levels
of general crime and violent crime, it spends comparatively little on police services. a
When compared with other similarly sized California cities with high rates of crime, San L
Bernardino falls below average in terms of police expenditures per capita and Part 1 0
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crime.
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Figure 3 shows police expenditures per Part 1 crime for a subset of cities in the state with
the highest crime rates. San Bernardino spends less per Part 1 crime than Stockton as well in
as the average of the three top crime cities. If San Bernardino was simply to reach the
average spending level it would take approximately$23.9 million in additional spending o
annually. °
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Figure 3. Similar Sized California Cities with Top Crime Rates— Police Expenditure per Part 1
Crime in FY 2014-15 ,r,
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$16,000 $14,125 _ T
$14,000
$12,000 --_-----m--.--- -- $10,858
$10,000 lh$8,146
$8,000 $6,306 a
$6,000 $7,291 d
$4,161 N
$4,000 .
$2,000
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Antioch Bakersfield Berkeley Concord Modesto Richmond San Stockton Vallejo Victorville v
Bernardino
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FY 2014-15 Total Police Expenditures per Part 1 Crime Peer Average d
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Sources:FY 2014-15 Adopted City Budgets;2014 Federal Bureau of Investigation Crime Reports d
Note:Part 1 crimes include violent and property crimes as defined by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
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In addition to the sobering statistics regarding crime,poverty and expenditures,the trends E
have not been positive in San Bernardino. Starting in 2008,police staffing levels began to Y
decline, and in 2011 response times to calls for service began to increase dramatically, as d
shown in Figure 4. While San Bernardino had previously experienced high levels of
violent crime, in the years preceding the bankruptcy filing, violent crime in San
Bernardino had dropped steadily for several years, and by 2011 the City's homicide rate
was half what it had been in 2005.
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Figure 4. San Bernardino's Trend of Priority 1 Response Time and Staffing
600 _ 25
500 20 N
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fl- 300 – --- — E
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100 5 ftf
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 3
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Year d
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Actual Sworn r . .- Actual Civilian d
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—0—Priority 1 Response Times ------Response Time Trend 2007 to 2011
Response Time Trend 2011 to 2014
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Source:San Bernardino Police Department p
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A year later, in 2012, San Bernardino began to experience an increase in violent crime
that coincided with the bankruptcy filing. The same combination of a shrinking police
force, a lack of investment in public safety and an increase in violent crime was also seen Ln
in Vallejo and Stockton around the time those cities went into bankruptcy, Increased gang o
activity, and a high rate of foreclosures and unemployment exacerbated the problem in
San Bernardino.
The Case for Investment a
The relationship between crime and the economy is a complicated one, with uncertainty
about the extent to which economic conditions influence crime rates,but a growing body
of research finds that high levels of crime hurt a city's economic prospects. In addition to Q
the direct costs stemming from the loss of human life, health and property, a 2010 study
by economists Claudio Detotto and Edoardo Ottranto found that"crime acts like a tax on 4)
the entire economy: it discourages domestic and foreign direct investments, reduces the 0
competitiveness of firms, and reallocates resources, creating uncertainty and o
inefficiency." a
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A 2012 study by Robert J. Shapiro and Kevin J. Hassett looking at the cost of violent E
crime found that reducing crime produces economic benefits. Specifically, a reduction in r
a given year of one homicide in a zip code causes a 1.5 percent increase in housing values a
in that same zip code the following year. The study estimated that a 10 percent reduction
in homicides would increase the value of the housing stock in the Seattle area, for
instance,by$2.9 billion,with resulting increases in the amount of property taxes
collected. The rise in property taxes is in addition to savings on direct costs such as
medical care, courts and corrections, police and the loss of productivity. Across the eight
cities the study examined,the direct costs arising from the four types of violent crimes
total nearly$3.7 billion per year, or an average of$320 per resident per year. The point is
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that increasing safety can have a direct economic benefit on a community in the form of
higher tax revenues and economic development.
One robust study of the relationship between police staffing and crime levels found that
medium to large cities in the United States would benefit 1.63 times in overall social
welfare for each dollar spent on police services. The 2012 study,by Justin McCrary and
Aaron Chalfin entitled"Are U.S. Cities Underpoliced; Theory and Evidence" developed
an econometric model for modeling the costs of crime and evaluating police expenditures
on crime levels. It ranked 242 medium and large cities nationally by the level of benefit
each city would receive from additional investments in police services. In some cases the a
evaluation yielded a benefit cost ratio of less than 1 but overall the average was as noted
in Figure 5.
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By this measure, San Bernardino was ranked the most under-policed large city in �
California and one of the highest in the United States. Effectively, for every dollar spent
on police services San Bernardino would enjoy an economic benefit of$3.60, or more
than twice the average of the cities studied. The benefit-cost ratio of California cities is N
shown in Figure 5. (Cities with a ratio of less than 1.0 are omitted.)
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Figure 5. Positive Benefit-Cost Ratio Cities in California in 2010
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Santa Barbara �� 1
Anaheim ( 1 C
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West Covina
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San Jose 1.1
Fullerton 1.1
San Francisco 1.2 d
Hayward !�M 1.2 +:
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Garden Grove I 1.2
Santa Ana 1 3
3
San Diego 1.3 j (D
Long Beach ! I 13 I 9
Downey 1.3 y
AVERAGE of All CA Cities in Study 1.5 N
Riverside 1.5 2
Los Angeles 18 0
Vallejo I ( X2.4 .-
Sacramento I2,4 C
Pomona ! I I I i 12.4 E
South Gate ' # 2.6 v
Bakersfield
2.6 �
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Stockton
Inglewood 2.71
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Fresno � i ��11�� j2,9
Richmond 1 l i 3.1 .
Oakland 3j3
San Bernardino i
3.6
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0
Sources:Chalfin,A.,and McCrary,J.(2013),Are U.S.Cities Underpoliced?Theory and evidence.NBER Working Paper
18815.
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San Bernardino is suffering from a disproportionate level of crime,particularly violent
crime. It is the most crime-ridden large city in Southern California, yet spends
significantly less than average for its size and the amount of crime experienced.
Furthermore, there is sound evidence that shows the community will benefit from lower
crime and reap an increase in social welfare and tax revenues as a result. Finally San
Bernardino has proven that it can lower crime,but it must have the money necessary to
do the job effectively.
Specifically, in many regions of Southern California, especially poorer urban areas with
significant gang problems, like San Bernardino, crime has been significantly decreased a
since the mid-2000s. This is attributed to many factors including smarter, data-driven, L
community policing (CompStat), gang interdiction special units, innovative prosecution o
programs, and community programs aimed at youth. Indeed prior to bankruptcy San
Bernardino was able to invest in these types of efforts and saw some decline in crime
(Part 1 crime declined by about 10%between 2008 and through 2011). Unfortunately,
bankruptcy forced the City to scale back these efforts, and crime rebounded erasing the in
reduction achieved, and then some. Part 1 climbed by almost 8 percent relative to 2008
by the end of 2012. Meanwhile the neighboring City of Riverside enjoyed a crime decline a
of 28 percent between 2008 and through 2012. San Bernardino can succeed in fighting
crime,but it needs the resources to do so. r
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To gain a greater understanding about the need for rebuilding the Police Department, the LO
next section describes the decline in police services over the last five years. This is
followed by a rebuilding plan and the cost to do so.
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A Decade of Core Service Reductions
Similar to other cities that find themselves in or on the brink of bankruptcy, the San
Bernardino Police Department (SBPD)had to change its service and police delivery
framework. While the predictable result has been longer response times and significantly v
reduced community policing efforts and incidence clearance rates,the more critical
outcome has been an inability to respond to serious community and business concerns
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about crime and related quality of life issues.
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The Police Department's sworn staffing levels have been in decline steadily since 2009,
while crime rates remain steady and response times rose to unacceptable levels. The
general service impacts can be described as follows:
• Sworn staffing has been reduced from 356 full-time equivalent (FTE) employees Q
in 2008 to 248 today(30% reduction),
• Patrol division sworn staffing has been reduced by 25% since 2008,
• Community policing teams have been scaled back by about 75%,
• Narcotics enforcement has been reduced by 50% since 2008,
• Traffic enforcement personnel were reduced by 58% since 2008,
• Priority 1 average response times increased 76% since 2008, and
• Almost 36% of patrol vehicles are overdue for replacement.
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Streamlining and civilianizing many administrative functions and some services, and
contracting others, over the last several years have reduced overall operational costs;
however, the department still faces the challenge of policing a City with high levels of
crime. Meeting this challenge will require additional financial resources, a stable,
credible department capable of attracting and retaining quality sworn officers, and a
proactive policing model in partnership with the community.
Budget and Authorized Sworn Officers
Table 2 provides a history of authorized sworn police staffing levels over the last 10
years. The City's sworn police staffing was at its peak of 356 positions in 2009. Since a
that time the number of sworn positions has decreased by almost 30%. Also, the number
of actual positions (those filled) is at the lowest level in a decade. a
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Table 2. History of Sworn Police Staffing Levels W
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Fiscal Year Budgeted Year-End Actual
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FY 2005-06 312 311
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FY 2006-07 330 323 0
FY 2007-08 346 346 a
FY 2008-09 356 324 d
FY 2009-10 350 326
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FY 2010-11 350 348 0
FY 2011-12 305 292
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FY 2012-13 281 272 =
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FY 2013-14 260 234 d
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FY 2014-15 248 229
FY 2015-16 248 214(November)
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Percent 6ange
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Source:San Bernardino Police Department
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The SBPD operational expenditures and authorized sworn officers over the last five years o°.
are described in Table 3. The table illustrates the Police Department's significant drops in
expenditures and total staffing since 2010, a period in which crime has increased E
significantly.
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Table 3. Historic Total Police Expenditures and Staffing from FY 2006 through FY 2016
FY 2005-06 2015-16 Percent
Change FY
2011 to 16.
Total Police Expenditures $52,981,508 $66,873,000 $59,482,478 -11%
Total Police Staffing 472 529 441 -17%
Source:Urban Futures Inc.,with the exception of FY 2005-06 expenditures(actuals as reported by the adopted FY
2008-09 budget)and FY 2015-16(total police staffing(as reported by the adopted FY 2015-16 budget).
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The SBPD has experienced difficulty in attracting quality candidates. In a recent hiring L
effort for sworn officers, three successfully made it through the process. Only two were N
hired out of 508 applicants who had progressed through the testing phase. One person
resigned almost immediately, and the other was injured early in the training phase. While
many police officers are attracted to a police department where they can obtain broad
experience, competition in the region is fierce and opportunities to serve in other agencies Cn
with more stability and reliable resources have impacted the SBPD hard. Table 4 shows ;'
the sworn officer turnover over the last five years which has decreased from a high of a
13% in 2014, but is still high.
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Table 4. Sworn Police Safety Turnover from Calendar Year 2011 to 2015 LO
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2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Turnover Rate 7% 8% 11% 13% 8% _
Source:Provided by the City of San Bernardino
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Note: 2015 is through October. L
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The current hiring environment has impacted many police agencies in California. With g
the exception of a small number of historically stable organizations in the region,most
agencies are struggling to fill vacant positions with qualified candidates. Prior to the 2
challenges that have impacted the City in recent years,the San Bernardino Police cn
Department historically had been an attractive department for potential officer
candidates. Stability in the department as well as within the City is critical to enabling the o
department to return its prior status. a.
Core Functions Impacted
Severe reductions in staffing allocations have resulted in a major redesign of the U
department's community policing program. While somewhat streamlined, the department a
is unable to respond to community concerns with the needed depth or develop long-term
strategies for the future. Narcotics enforcement has been reduced by about 58% and the
department's ability to respond to gang-related issues by about 20%. A 58%reduction in
officers allocated to traffic enforcement has increased safety concerns on City streets and
has also reduced citation revenue that could be used to offset enforcement costs.
Response times to emergency priority calls (violent felonies) have increased 34% since
2010, and response times for Priority 4 calls (policy reports) have lengthened by 237%.
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Due to current staffing levels,patrol officers spend nearly the entirety of every shift
responding to one call and moving immediate) h n
p g g y to the ext. This affords little or no
opportunity for officers to engage in proactive law enforcement to address street-level
crime, including prostitution,panhandling, and traffic safety issues such as speeding.
Residents see officers driving by such obvious criminal activity and are frustrated by the
perception that the department is not addressing these issues. They may believe that the
officer is not concerned, and is simply ignoring the problem.
What they do not realize is that the officer is responding to a previously reported call for
service. In some cases,the reporting party may have already been waiting an extended ca
period of time, often hours and on occasion days for a police officer to respond. The -
current situation is frustrating for the community and the officers. Many officers find
themselves repeatedly apologizing for the extended delay. The compounded frustration of N
repeatedly encountering dissatisfied residents has a negative impact on overall
department morale. The street-level officers know they have no control over the budget
and staffing, and as such cannot take steps to improve the problem. It also leads the
community to lose confidence in the department's ability to address crime. cn
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Delayed Response Times c
A major concern both within the department and the community has been the continued °
lengthening of response times to calls for service. Three factors have contributed to the
Police Department's continuing challenge to improve response times:
• Sworn staffing levels,
• The crime rate, and
• Technology inefficiencies.
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Police response times are organized by type of call priority(E, 1, 2, 3,4, 5, and 6) as a
shown in Table 5. a;
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Table 5. Priority Levels and Description
Priority Level Description 0
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Priority E Immediate,life-threatening emergency. �
Priority 1 Serious threat of bodily injury(felonies and serious crimes in progress). �
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Priority 2 Potentially serious calls such as in-progress misdemeanors,suspicious persons,etc. n-
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Possible hazardous conditions or disturbances of no known immediate danger.
Priority 3 E
Crimes against persons that are not in progress. t
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Priority 4 Property crimes not in progress,administrative activities and municipal code y
violations. Q
Priority 5 Abandoned vehicles,informational entries for field personnel (non-routine calls for
service,e.g.,be on the lookout(BOLO),information,etc.)
Priority 6 Rescheduled calls for service(intentionally delayed response due to temporary
unavailability of reporting party)
Source:Provided by the City of San Bernardino Police Department
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Table 6 provides a history of response times by Priority Type. In part,response times for
lower priorities have changed as a result of implementing alternatives to an officer
response, such as on-line or desk reporting.
Table 6. Response Times by Priority Type
Change from
Type 2010 2015 YTD 2010 to 2015 %Change
Priority E 4.85 8.47 3.62 75% c
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Priority 1 13.27 35.56 22.29 168% o-
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Priority 2 29.54 110.56 81.02 274%
Priority 3 54.86 154.32 99.46 181% m
Priority 4 58.81 198.25 139.44 237% d
Priority 5 98.54 200.52 101.98 103% .2 2
Priority 6 - 98.17 N/A N/A N
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Overall 34.59 100.43 65.84 190%
Source:Provided by the City of San Bernardino a.
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Figure 6 shows that with the current level of staffing and expenditures,response times are
quite lengthy. A person could wait from 30 minutes to over two hours for an event that
would likely rank as important to their quality of life or be perceived as a serious threat.
0
Figure 6. Response Times by Priority Type in 2015(YTD) r
c
250 _ 0.
d
198.25 200.52 N
200 _ cc
154.32 to
d
150 __ 2
110.56 G1
100 __ 98.17 CO
V
O
50 35.56 d.
8.47 d
0 __. t
Priority E Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Priority 4 Priority 5 Priority 6
w
Sources:Provided by the City of San Bernardino Q
The calculation of response times consists of three components: Call Create Time, Call
Hold Time and In-route Time. Call Create Time is the amount of time elapsed in
answering the call received from the reporting party and completing the initial data entry.
Call Hold Time is the amount of time elapsed between the completion of the data entry
until the call is actually dispatched for a field response by an officer(s). In-route time is
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calculated as the amount of time elapsed between initial dispatch of the officer(s) and the
arrival of the first officer at the incident.
In FY 2014-15 the department experienced a distinct increase in average overall response
times at all priority levels. The aggregate call holding time average has also lengthened,
as evidenced in Table 7.
Table 7. Hold Times by Priority Type, in minutes
C ange since July
Type July 2014 Current 2014 %Change
c
ca
a
G)
v
Priority E 1.73 2.58 0.85 49% o
Priority 1 10.28 28.68 18.4 179%
Priority 2 45.11 109.67 64.56 143%
Priority 3 78.64 138.81 60.17 77% m
Cn
Priority 4 108.83 186.81 77.98 72% (D
v
Source:Provided by the City of San Bernardino .2
a
The most noticeable increase in the response times has been in the category of Call Hold
Time or the amount of time before an officer is available to be dispatched in response to a
Priority E, 1 or 2 call. The fundamental factor contributing to the increase in Call Hold
Time is the lack of officers available to respond. Fewer officers deployed on a particular c
shift have reduced the number and availability of officers to respond to calls as they are
received. Additionally, the City's current report writing platform and technology is not as =
efficient as it could be, which lengthens the time in the field to complete incident reports.
a
Residents and business owners continue to express strong dissatisfaction with the L
extended timeframes associated with responding to their calls for help, regardless of the U)
priority assigned to the incident.
y
Technology
The current state of San Bernardino Police Department's technology and systems is
indicative of the lack of ongoing investment in technology and strategic planning °4'
experienced by the entire city. The ability to think strategically and implement best 'o
practices has been difficult while the department has been in a constant reactive mode 0-
and focused on delivering core services. Due in part to this issue, the systems and
technology infrastructure used by the Police Department have been minimally E
maintained.
Computer Aided Dispatch/Records Management System (CAD/RMS) Q
There are serious deficiencies in the current CAD/RMS and Mobile Reporting Writing
system. As a result, it barely functions for the department and minimally meets
operational needs. For example, in the Dispatch Center there are long delays in loading
search screens and 911 caller information does not auto-populate call screens, which can
result in dispatchers waiting 10 to 20 seconds before they can start using the system.
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These types of delays should not occur in a Dispatch Center with the call volume of
SBPD. Police officers in the field using the mobile report writing system also have
difficulty entering notes to the narrative section of the reports, delaying their ability to be
in service. Issues and deficiencies need to be documented based on a formal evaluation of
the software and how it is used. The City should then work with the vendor to resolve the
issues. The evaluation should also include a review of other CAD/RMS police systems
and the lack of integration to historical data. The department needs to begin allocating
funding for a replacement system now as the current system's contract will expire in June
2020 and such systems are expensive.
E
Lack of Investment in Technology a
The SBPD suffers from a lack of investment in other technology that makes it more L
difficult for police to respond and ultimately results in a less-safe city. The servers and a
storage used by the CAD/RMS systems are near their end of life and storage capacity and
there is currently no funding for replacement.
Mobile computers in police vehicles (about 100 units) are aging and in some case are N
almost 10 years old. Further, desktop computers (about 55) are past their end of life and
are still using the XP operating system, which is no longer supported. None of these o
systems are funded for replacement and the Police Department has been using savings a
from other operational areas to upgrade failing systems. Planning for these critical
investments will also require substantial information technology project management
both within and outside the department. Ln
0
There is also no adequate plan for both business continuity and disaster recovery should
anything happen to the headquarters building where the current servers are configured.
This would place the SBPD in jeopardy and potentially unable to access critical systems a
until such time as replacement hardware was acquired and configured, and if necessary ;
an alternative location to the place the equipment identified.
a�
An Aging Fleet
For the past decade,the City has not replaced its vehicles and equipment in accordance in
with industry standards. Even municipalities with limited resources will typically allocate
some funding on an ongoing basis to replace safety vehicles; however, there is no vehicle a
replacement fund, or funded program to replace aging vehicles across the City or in the
Police Department. Without the funds allocated for replacement, vehicles are kept on the
road longer to extend their operational life and continue providing basic services. As a
result repair costs escalate and vehicles remain out of service for longer periods of time
which also directly impacts the ability to put officers in the field. a
The Police Department currently has 251 vehicles in service, including 100 patrol units.
Ninety units, representing 36% of the Police Department's total fleet, are currently either
overdue for replacement or will be by 2016 at an estimated cost of about$3 million.
More than half of the police fleet is 10 years old or older. Fifty-six of the units currently
have more than 100,000 miles. Table 8 shows the Police Department's aging fleet.
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Table 8. Age of Fleet Units in the Police Department
Age Number of Units %of .
Less than 4 years 41 16%
5 to 9 years 80 32%
10 to 14 years 113 45%
15 years or older 17 7%
The Police Department will need to replace 75% of its fleet over the next five years. This v
equates to 187 units at a cost of approximately$6.7 million. Based on this, operational a
costs including fuel,parts, labor and commercial repairs over the same period are L
estimated to cost$1.8 million. If these units are not replaced, the repair costs will y
increase substantially to keep the police fleet operational and on the road.
a�
Historically, the department has had to cobble together salary savings or other scarce
funding sources in order to buy vehicles. A fleet best practice is to establish a dedicated cn
fleet replacement fund in which fleet customers contribute funds over time to accumulate 0)
the necessary funds to purchase vehicles in the future. The City would need to contribute a
about $2.1 million annually over the next five years to have funds available for future
Police Department fleet purchases.
T
Ln
A Plan to Rebuild o
The proposed Police Services rebuilding plan focuses on building staff capacity to
transition the department out of the crisis response mode experienced over the last five to
ten years to one capable of providing a core level of service to the community. And as a
critically important, the plan is intended to provide the required depth and capacity to
strategically plan for the future and partner with the community to reduce crime and
attract investment. The overall rebuilding plan focuses on the following three objectives: U)
aD
1. Rebuild staff capacity to be able to deliver the core mission and reduce call
as
response times;
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2. Invest in training a police workforce able to deliver 21"century law enforcement;
3. Utilize technology to improve efficiency and effectiveness; and a.
4. Engage the community in strategies to reduce crime and increase economic
development opportunities.
E
Proposed Staffing Plan a
The goal of the staffing plan over the next five years is to achieve the staffing level the
department believes necessary at a minimum. This will enable it to deliver its core
service mission, reduce call response times, and provide the depth required to engage
with the community on a path to improving the overall quality of life.
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Table 9 provides a proposed five-year staffing plan that results in 89 new positions, for an
overall 29%increase in authorized sworn positions The addition of 72 new sworn
positions will still be below the department's peak staffing level of 356 in FY 2009.
Table 9. Proposed Police Five- Year Staffing Plan
Positions FY 2015-16 FY 2016-17 FY 2017-18 FY 2018-19 FY 2019-20 Total
SWORN
Lieutenant 0 0 1 0 0 1
c
Sergeant 0 2 2 1 0 5
CL
Detective 0 2 2 1 0 5
L
Police Officer 0 15 15 15 16 61
0
V)
SWORN Subtotal 0 19 20 17 16 72 m
Professional U
Animal Control Officer 1 1 0 0 0 2 y
N
Crime Analyst 1 1 0 0 0 2 0)
Community Engagement 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
Officer
T
Criminal Investigation 0 2 1 2 0 5 1*
T
Officer
LO
Dispatcher 0 3 1 0 0 4 �
0
Forensic Specialist 1/II 0 0 2 0 0 2
T
Personnel and Training 1 0 0 0 0 1 c
Technician t°
CL
PROFESSIONAL Subtotal 3 8 4 2 0 17 a;
N
� 0
Source:Provided by the City of San Bernardino
Increased staffing levels accompanied by improved incident reporting strategies and
technology would have a substantial impact on reducing call response times. While it will U)
take time to hire and train new personnel, there will be incremental improvements as they
complete training and begin working on their own. (Increasing personnel and training °.
n
staff will be a critical component to our hiring process because of the increased number
of applicants who will need to be recruited over the next five years.) E
0
It is difficult to establish quantifiable call response benchmarks without knowing the pace Q
at which new personnel will be brought on board; however, the long-term goal would be
to reduce response times to pre-bankruptcy levels. The researcher McCrary also points
out that police departments need to hire about 4% of their sworn staff as a replacement
rate; in San Bernardino this will likely have to be higher.
Increased staffing would also have a significant impact on the ability of the department to
redeploy officers and other staff to address those critical community issues related to
gangs, illegal narcotics,prostitution, and traffic enforcement. Increasing both sworn and
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5.K.a
civilian staffing levels will provide renewed capacity to the department to be able to
reconstitute or expand some of the specialty units designed to address these issues and
reduce associated crime. The gang unit was credited with a reduction in homicides in
2011, an achievement recognized by the National League of Cities at the time.
The San Bernardino Police Department also recognizes the need to improve staffing
efficiencies and workload allocation. Utilizing professional staff in ways beyond
traditional thinking will enable the department to enhance service delivery to the public
and improve organizational health. The department's goal is also to increase the number
of professional and technical staff,who in turn will assist the department and community
0.
with new opportunities to improve service and mitigate the cause of crime. For example,
the department continues to shift how crime is addressed by using predictive analytics.
0
N
Adding crime analysts is paramount to our ability to predict when crime will occur and to
build data trees (relationship studies) to help solve crimes already committed. Criminal
investigation officers (CIOs) have become valuable assets in the Investigations Division.
These criminalists work alongside detectives, develop leads, and have assigned N
caseloads. This position is the new direction for law enforcement, and the Police U
Department is setting the example. Forensic specialists process crime scenes and collect a..
DNA evidence and SBPD has enhanced its ability to collect and process such evidence.
Adding these positions will be instrumental in our future efforts.
LO
The City is required by state law to provide animal control services. The best way to
serve the community is to have 24-hour animal control service. The additional animal °
control officers (ACOs)will enhance our ability to provide this critical service after r
normal business hours.
CL
Community Engagement and Strategic Planning
Department force reductions have virtually eliminated most of the traditional community
policing structure that existed prior to the financial crisis and bankruptcy. A steady high y
crime rate combined with staffing reductions significantly reduced the Police U
Department's ability to engage in positive community engagement efforts and directed
problem solving efforts to make neighborhoods better places to live and work. N
0
Although the SBPD is still one of the larger police departments in the region, current °a
crime and workload issues result in a workforce completely consumed in managing the c
policing challenges of the day. Additional capacity will provide the depth.needed in the E
department to once again provide directed enforcement efforts to specific issues and
rebuild the community policing capacity and positive community engagement efforts a
needed in the City. The recently approved community engagement officer (CEO) is a first
step in this effort.
The department has also embarked upon a strategic planning effort to guide the
implementation of the proposed ramp-up in staffing and resources, engage the
community and face the challenges of 21S`century law enforcement efficiently and
effectively.
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Five-Year Cost
Implementation of the building plan will require an additional General Fund allocation to
the Police Department of about$59.8 million. Table 10 projects police General Fund
expenditures for the next five years using the same assumptions employed in the 20-year
budget model associated with the City's bankruptcy planning. The projections include
the staffing ramp-up, associated salary and benefit costs, as well as critical investments in
the department's information systems and aging fleet.
Table 10. Projected Police Budget with Staffing Plan
Budgeted Projected 'Projected Projected c
c�Projected Cumulative IL
Projected 1 1 1
L
Budgeted Expenditures
O
Salaries and Benefits $48,654,807 $51,017,787 $52,879,720 $55,301,220 $57,744,761 $59,202,483 $324,800,779
Operating Expenses $8,465,320 $8,719,280 $8,980,858 $9,250,284 $9,527,792 $9,813,626 $54,757,160 O
V
Total Budgeted $57,120,127 $59,737,067 $61,860,578 $64,551,504 $67,272,553 $69,016,109 $379,557,939
d
Additional Expenditures Cl)
d
Salaries and Benefits $211,545 $3,258,675 $6,567,080 $9„341,851 $11,836,841 $12,030,324 $43,246,315 v
Operating Expenses $892,100 $3,538,591 $2,787,142 $2,912,942 $1,806,742 $1,320,265 $13,257,783 O
a
Total Additional $1,103,645 $6,797,266 $9,354,211 $12,254.793 $13,643,583 $13,350,589 $56,504,098 T
d'
• :11 :1. :1 . i. 1 r
Source:Provided by the Urban Futures. Additional information regarding vehicle replacement and technology cost LO
provided by Management Partners. 7
0
The analysis assumes vehicle replacement and future purchases will be adjusted in the
citywide capital investment section of the 20 year model for police vehicle purchases. c
a
L
The Police Department's focus on core services is also dependent on reliable information N
systems and technology. Ongoing investment in technology is important to all public
agencies;today a municipality cannot function without reliable and sustainable
information technology systems. As the Police Department rebuilds its workforce,
resources also need to be allocated to address existing hardware and systems to address or in
replace the systems that do not support basic core services and invest in those that bring 0
significant value to reducing crime. o
a
Conclusion
s
R
San Bernardino has made progress in its efforts to recover from its bankruptcy, from the Q
difficult decision to approve the Plan of Adjustment to the ongoing effort to reform the
City's Charter. Investing in the San Bernardino Police Department is an essential
component of the City's strategy for recovery that will pay tangible dividends; a failure to
address crime will likewise hinder other efforts to stabilize the City and encourage its
economic growth.
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