Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout19-City Attorney , CITY OF SAN BERNARDINO - REQUEST FOR COUNCIL ACTION From: James F. Penman Subject: Request to join as an Amicus in the Support of the City of Oceanside in Penn Pacific Properties, Inc. v. City of Oceanside, et at. Dept CITY ATTORNEY Date: May 20, 1997 ORIG/ivAL Synopsis of Previous Council action: None. Recommended motion: Authorize City Attorney's office to join Amicus in Support of the City of Oceanside. 7.f~ Signature Contact person: Robert L. Simmons Phone: 5355 Supporting data attached: Ward: All FUNDING REQUIREMENTS: Amount Source: Finance: Council Notes: --~ Agenda Item No._Lq 75-0262 ~IR /'e CITY ClF' ClCEANSIDE OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY MEMORANDUM TO: California City Attorneys FROM: Dan Hentschke, Oceanside City Attorno/lf" DATE: April 18, 1997 SUBJECT: Request to Join as an Amicus in the Support of the City of Oceanside in Penn Pacific Properties, Inc. v. City of Oceanside. et ai., Cal. Court of Appeal, 4th Appellate District, Case No. D027SSS. SUMMARY The City of Oceanside is requesting amicus support in its appeal of a $2.4 million judgment (not counting attorneys' fees, costs and interest) finding that the adoption of an "Equestrian Overlay District" zoning ordinance resulted in a total taking of the plaintiff's property and violated plaintiff's civil rights by denying substantive due process and equal protection. The city is appealing the judgment based upon numerous errors by the trial court. It is requesting amicus assistance only with respect to the issues of ripeness and standard of review for legislative actions. In December, 1996 the Legal Advocacy Committee of the League of California Cities urged cities to join in supporting the amicus brief on behalf the City. To date twenty-two cities have joined in this effort. Dave Larsen, a former member of the Legal Advocacy Committee, has volunteered to write the amicus brief which will focus on the public policy considerations behind the ripeness doctrine in regulatory "taking" cases and the deference generally shown by courts toward legislative acts, along with the legitimate need for legislative bodies to respond to concerns raised by citizens through the adoption of legislation. Ron Ball, City Attorney for Carlsbad has been designated by the Committee to review the brief. Rachel Hooper of Shute, Mihaly & Wienberger is assisting me with the preparation of the appellants' briefs. 300 NORTH COAST HIGHWAY. OCEANSIDE, CA 92054. FAX (6ts} 966-4457 . PHONE (6ts} 966 4444 (7601 (760) .- Memorandum Re: Request for amicus assistance. April 18, 1996 Page 2 DISCUSSION This case arises out of the adoption ofan ordinance in 1991 to add the Equestrian Overlay District ("the EQ Overlay") to the Oceanside Zoning Ordinance and applying the EQ Overlay to 889 acres of property in the City of Oceanside, including 82 acres owned by the Plaintiff. In adopting the ordinance, the city council was responding to concerns by citizens that the semi- rural character of their neighborhood was being lost. Although theses concerns were renewed at a meeting during which the city council considered approval of a final subdivision map for property owned by another developer ("Marlborough") in the vicinity ofplaintiff's-land. The citizens concerns were directed at both the proposed development of plaintiff's land and the proposed development of Marlborough's land. Shortly after approving Marlborough's final map for the other developer, the city council adopted a resolution directing consideration of an amendment to the zoning ordinance to establish standards for an equestrian area of the city. After over six months of study, the ordinance was ultimately adopted. At all times, the underlying zoning was for single family residential use at 1 - 4 dwelling units per acre. During hearings on the ordinance, the plaintiff's representatives testified against it on the ground that it would interfere with their plans to develop the property for 154 dwelling units as permitted by their tentative map. They never testified that the ordinance would make the property undevelopable. After the adoption of the ordinance, the plaintiff's previously approved tentative subdivision map expired when the city council refused to grant a time extension. Plaintiff did not have a vesting tentative map and never filed a final map. In response to the adoption of the ordinance and refusal to grant a time extension, plaintiff launched its multi-pronged judicial attack to invalidate the ordinance, reinstate the tentative map and obtain damages. Later, in a wholly unrelated action, the city amended the hillside development regulations which also applied to the plaintiff's property. During the "writ" phase of the proceeding the court validated the ordinance by finding that it was not arbitrary or capricious and rejected plaintiff's CEQA and Subdivision Map Act challenges. During the time between the rejection of the writ and trial on the constitutional claims, and pursuant to a stipulation between the parties the plaintiff submitted a proposal to amend the EQ Overlay to the City for consideration. The proposal was unanimously rejected by the Planning Commission and City Council. The plaintiff never submitted any application for development of the subject property under the challenged regulations. .' Memorandum Re: Request for amicZls assistance. April 18. 1996 Page 3 Despite the City's argument that the case was not ripe, the court allowed the case to go to trial on three damage causes of action. Those were: (a) a substantive due process claim for damages: (b) an equal protection claim: and (c) a claim for "damages for taking of property without just compensation." Throughout the life of this case the city asserted that all "as applied" challenges must be dismissed as a matter oflaw for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground of "ripeness." It also asserted at trial that the "facial" challenges had been decided in its favor during the writ stage and even if some facial challenges remained. the ordinance on its face permitted development of the property for residential purposes. blanket" variances. During trial. the court was extremely troubled by the fact that the city had adopted the EQ Overlay in response to citizen outcry over the degradation of the rural atmosphere in the vicinity and the loss of equestrian opportunities in the neighborhood. but then proceeded to adopt an ordinance which established high performance standards for horse yards different from those applicable elsewhere in the city. The court was also troubled by the fact that a member of the planning commission and the commissioner's wife, were particularly vocal in their opposition to the initial development proposed by the plaintiff and continued to oppose the project throughout the consideration of the EQ Overlay. After the liability phase of trial, the court found a total regulatory taking notwithstanding the plain language of the zoning ordinance preserving residential land uses and evidence that the property could be used for residential purposes within the density range established by the general plan. In evaluating the ordinance to determine whether it substantially advanced a legitimate governmental interest the court applied a heightened scrutiny analysis. The court also ignored the testimony of city officials that the property could be developed for residential purposes consistent with the general plan and found that there was no economically viable use of the property. Essentially, the trial court showed absolutely no deference to the judgment of the city council in adopting the challenged zoning regulations, ignored standard "vesting" law, and awarded damages to a developer in a traditional down-zoning case. After trial. plaintiff sold the property for an apparent value of over $1,000,000. The trial court did not find this fact to be sufficient newly discovered evidence to grant a new trial. IMPORTANCE OF THIS CASE TO CITIES GENERALLY All cities. from time to time. are faced with the prospect of changing zoning regulations in response to community concerns. In this instance. the city attempted to adopt an ordinance and apply it to property according to well developed rules relating to "vesting:' had the ordinance Memorandum Re: Request for amicus assistance. April 18, 1996 Page 4 sustained against a challenge that it was arbitrary and capricious under state law, only to fmd itself subject to a "taking" claim during which the court ignored settled principles of separation of powers and applied a "heightened scrutiny" analysis to the city's actions. Cities have a common interest in knowing the standards which courts will apply to determine whether a taking claim is ripe for adjudication and for determining whether an ordinance substantially furthers a legitimate governmental interest.